Incidents

Optimizely Web Experimentation Supply Chain Attack Injects Malicious Code Into Customer Websites

A flaw in Optimizely's signup process let an attacker act as an admin on customer accounts and alter scripts served on at least 178 organizations' sites.

Optimizely Web Experimentation Supply Chain Attack Injects Malicious Code Into Customer Websites

On November 17, Optimizely disclosed a security incident affecting its Web Experimentation service. A flaw in the signup process allowed an unauthorized party to act as an existing user with administrator privileges on certain customer accounts and modify the JavaScript code in their projects. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 and Netskope have described the malicious code, which reached the websites of at least 178 organizations.

What happened

According to Optimizely’s report, the first malicious changes to project code were made on November 16 at 07:51 UTC. The company detected the activity at 13:34, closed the vulnerability at 16:10, and by 22:24 had removed the injected code from all affected projects. Optimizely said no passwords were stolen; the attacker relied on publicly available information and a brute-force method to impersonate users. The company has engaged Mandiant to conduct an independent investigation.

Unit 42 and Netskope reported that the modified script was served from Optimizely’s own infrastructure. Their findings include theft of payment card data from web forms, swapping of cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and attempts to deliver tools that exploit vulnerabilities in Apple devices. Netskope noted that its telemetry came from a subset of its own customers, and that a recorded request to attacker infrastructure does not by itself prove a device was successfully compromised.

Optimizely stated that the incident affected only Web Experimentation; it found no impact on Feature Experimentation, its SDKs, or the legacy Full Stack service. The mere presence of the Optimizely script on a website does not mean that a customer’s project was modified. The company is confirming affected customers on an individual basis.

Who is affected and what to do

Organizations using Optimizely Web Experimentation should confirm directly with the vendor whether their projects were affected. The report gives an overall window of changes from 07:51 to 22:24 UTC on November 16, but Optimizely is providing exact time windows to each affected customer.

  • Confirm with Optimizely whether your projects were affected, and identify which of your websites were running the script.
  • Review CSP violation reports as well as network, CDN and server logs from November 16, and compare deployed code against approved versions.
  • Review administrator accounts, active sessions and configuration changes; revoke any unrecognized sessions or tokens.
  • If the script ran on pages with payment card forms or cryptocurrency transfers, analyze the transactions and coordinate next steps with your payment processor.
  • Preserve the logs needed for incident analysis and verify that your websites have an appropriate Content Security Policy (CSP) in place.

SecurHUB’s take

This incident shows that third-party code running in the user’s browser can compromise the security of an entire website. Penetration testing helps assess how third-party scripts are controlled and what data they can access.

Sources: Optimizely – incident report, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Netskope Threat Labs

AuthorSecurHUB Team

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